by Tuğrul Ibrahim Turan
Dutch and Belgian authorities have been noting an immense increase in the illegal cocaine smuggling through the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp. The increased volume of illegal trade has alerted Dutch and Belgian law enforcement units to wage a subsequent war on drug smuggling. The Dutch and Belgian case is at the heart of internationalization of mafia networks, whose main protagonist is the Netherlands based Mocro Mafia. With its origins in the Rif region of Morocco and led by Moroccan descent migrants in Benelux, the Mocro Mafia has become a critical player in European drug trafficking. Its genesis and rise sheds light on socio-political realities in Morocco and Europe. The Mocro Mafia’s origins are found in the history of Rifains and the abundance of cannabis in the region. Moroccan quasi-monopoly over the drug trade into the Netherlands has agitated far-right politics of the country, while the Moroccan diaspora is increasingly subject to marginalization and Islamophobia. The article will dive into the history of Mocro Mafia, whose genesis goes back to Morocco’s infamous Rif region, the current right-wing politics, war on drugs and conditions of the Moroccan diaspora.
The history of Moroccan organized crime originates from Morocco’s most impoverished region, the Rif. Situated in the north of the country from Tangier to Moulouya, this mountainous region hosts Riffian Berber communities whose identity has long been a source of marginalization. The Rif fought against the colonial Spanish power during the 1920s and rose up against the Moroccan central state, which highlights the region’s long history of contestation with central powers. The establishment of the Republic of Rif by Abdel Karim Khattabi, and Rif's long history of uprisings, led the monarchy to consider the Riffians hostile to the Moroccan state – the Makhzen. For long, their Berber identity and language repressed and unrecognized, the Rifains were marginalized in Moroccan society. Their identity being Berber, belonging to a unique culture, speaking a dialect on mountainous lands, and having been subjected to distinct historical processes, the Rifians were never in absolute conformity with the Makzhen. Thus, the Rif was left underdeveloped and marginalized, while tribal rule in the region continued. Repression and social marginalization was coupled with the region’s long history of cannabis production. The Rif is the world’s largest cannabis cultivation area. According to figures provided by the Ministry of Interior to the Agence France-Presse in 2013, 700,000 people lived off the production of cannabis in the country, with the Rif leading the figures. Given the predominance of Islam in Morocco, a society ruled by the 'Alawi dynasty, cannabis cultivation and recreational usage is illegal in the country. Although the abundance of cannabis in this isolated, mountainous region is what the local communities live off, the plant itself played a role in their marginalization. The region went through decades of repression under the reign of Hassan II, while prior to that, the Moroccan King Mohammed V had put the region under military occupation in 1958. Strong military presence led to a decrease of investments that could bolster the economy of the region. The Rif’s mountainous outline did not help its already impoverished economy, which for long depended on seasonal labor in Algeria. Consequently, the Rif stayed underdeveloped, with a low schooling level, deficiencies in healthcare, and high unemployment levels. The estimated unemployment rate remained at 46% in 2012. Instead, the Makzhen historically preferred concentrating the investments in central parts of the country, which, combined with years of marginalization, led to the protests of the Hirak Rif movement in 2016, where the Riffains rose up against abandonment and demanded socio-economic reforms.
It was during the 1960s that some Riffains found themselves a way out, far from Morocco. The destination was Europe, the Netherlands and Belgium. In order to address the worker shortage during the postwar economic boom period, the Netherlands signed the bilateral treaty for the recruitment of guest workers. Belgium had already signed a similar deal with Morocco five years prior, in 1964. Moroccans were given labor in mines, iron and steel industries. Migration had already been well under way, as Moroccans had started taking routes towards Europe. Yet the deal signed the first official wave of migration from Morocco to Benelux, the first stage of migration that engrained the Moroccan diaspora in Dutch society. From the 1970s, the family reunification schemes increased further immigration to the Netherlands. Within Morocco, it was the Rif region that stood out in the migration toll. Noted by van Heelsum as well, “the migration to the Netherlands largely consisted of Berbers from the Rif and to a lesser degree from the southern regions around Ouarzazate and Agadir.” Upon their arrival, Moroccan migrants faced intersectional barriers to inclusion. The obstacles being language, culture, religion and broader difficulties in interacting with the Dutch, the marginalization in Rif persisted abroad. As Moroccans were settling in Europe throughout the 1970s, the Dutch authorities were loosening cannabis regulations. The drug was decriminalized in the Netherlands during the early 1970s, while coffee shops were authorized for its sale in 1976. While cannabis laws were loosened, allowing recreational usage of the drug to bolster tourism, the drug was state-controlled and its unregulated trade stayed illegal. At this point, the history of Moroccan migrants and the Dutch cannabis project crossed paths. There emerged an opportunity for the diaspora Moroccans to export the plant from their region of origin, the Rif, where the plant was abundant. Thus, in the 1980s, the first mafia structures of Moroccan migrants came to being through the illegal smuggling of cannabis in the Netherlands. In the early years Moroccan organized crime limited itself to cannabis smuggling, soon other narcotic drugs followed suit – the most lucrative being cocaine. Along the way, the Moroccan mafia resorted to various sorts of violence, extortions, torture and bribe. It was the Moroccan migration from the world’s highest intensity cannabis production area to another drug-haven, ignited by jeopardization and repression, that led to the birth of Moroccan organized crime networks in Benelux.
Throughout the years, the Moroccan mafia in Europe turned the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam to a hub of international drug smuggling. This mafia network is called Mocro Mafia, “mocro” being a widely used slang term to describe someone of a Moroccan immigrant background. Later the term gained its actual connotation, used by Dutch and Belgian authorities as an umbrella term to denote the mafia networks of Moroccan origin in Benelux. The success of Mocro Mafia, as it should be understood in a network context of Mocro Mafia(s) in plural, owes its rise to tight cooperation between hierarchical and loosely organized group cells, operative in the closely positioned ports of Antwerp, Rotterdam and Algeciras in Spain. The organization’s motto is, “Wie praat, die gaat” – “Whoever talks, dies”, bearing similarities to the Southern Italian code of silence, omertà. The Mocro Mafia is in active collaboration with mafia networks extending to Colombian and Mexican cartels. This international cooperation allows Morocco’s geographical position to be exploited as a passageway to Europe from South America. The Mocro Mafia gained media attention in the 2010s as a result of several incidents that include the killing of Nabil Amzieb, a 23 years old Moroccan, the discovery of a torture cell by the Dutch authorties inside shipping containers, and the attack on the Dutch journal De Teleegraf. Bribing of port officials results in smooth cocaine flow in customs through which Mocro Mafia operates. Recently, its leadership has been damaged due to arrests and an inter-clan dispute that erupted in 2012 with the most notable case being the imprisonment of Mocro Mafia’s boss Ridouan Taghi. In 2019, he was arrested in Dubai, followed by his right-hand Said Razzouki, who was arrested in Medellin months after Taghi in 2020. During the process of Marengo, 17 suspects including Taghi and Razzouki were tried over charges of murder and attempted murder. The process was concluded on February 27, 2024, resulting in life imprisonment sentences for Taghi, Razzouki and Mario Romo as well as charges amounting to months for the rest of the accused. Several prominent Dutch figures were assassinated by the Mocro Mafia during the process of Marengo, such as journalist Peter R. de Vries and the lawyer Derk Wiersum. Threats and killings resulting from the process of Marengo led the Dutch authorities to alert security measures in the country, resulting in the Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte and the Dutch crown princess to be put under police protection. Increasing criminal activity of the Mocro Mafia, seen in public assassinations and the volume of cocaine trade entering Europe put pressure on Dutch authorities to limit criminal networks.
The Mocro Mafia’s harm on Dutch society and the broader region is undeniable, while it should be stressed that multiple sides lose from criminal activity. Alongside those who lost their lives, faced extortions, torture and numerous brutal mafia violence, the Moroccan diaspora in the Netherlands is first-hand impacted. Difficult integration level in society, obstacles on the way of education and cultural differences had already put them in social enclosure. Not surprisingly, the Dutch of Moroccan descent are poorer than their ethnic-descent Dutch counterparts. Combined with the rise of the Mocro-Mafia, it is the Moroccan diaspora who sees their community put under spotlight by the rising far-right and islamophobia trend. Geert Wilders, a far-right Dutch politician and the leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV) is the main agitator of islamophobic discourse that is on the rise against Moroccans. His islamophobic discourse extends to judicial cases and controversies surrounding his statements. Wilders was convicted for inciting discrimination during a political rally in 2014 in which he asked his supporters if they wanted more or less Moroccans in the country. As PVV supporters chanted “Fewer! Fewer! Fewer!”, his response was grave: “We are going to take care of that”. Wilders is known for his controversial comments on hijab, for whom hijab and Islam represent backwardness. During the election campaign, his party promised bans on Islamic schools, hijab and the Qur’an. For the far-right, Moroccans are the scapegoats, as the mafia networks led by Moroccan descent migrants gain power, the Moroccan community becomes “scums” according to Wilders. While Islampohobic agitators associate the Moroccan image with crime and mafia, so does popular culture. The TV show Mocro Maffia, aired in 2018, exacerbates prejudices and inevitably links Moroccan identity to crime, not contributing to the already worn image of the Moroccan community. Many Dutch themselves are surprised to see the far-right discourse gaining prevalence, manifested in the November 2023 Dutch general elections whereby PVV became the biggest party in the parliament. Abdou Menebhi, head of the Dutch non-profit association EMCEMO for political and social participation of Moroccan diaspora in the Netherlands says: “We’ve always faced racism but never to the level we are facing today.” The tense climate leads to marginalization of Moroccans, manifested in vandalism, threats and attacks against mosques in the Netherlands. Dutch scholar Ineke van der Valk’s research provides numbers: 54 attacks took place against mosques in 2016, with a rise of 26 more attacks compared to the year before.
The future will tell how successful Dutch authorities will be in fighting Mocro Mafia networks in Benelux. Undoubtedly, the process of Marengo represents a success story in the name of legality. While Dutch authorities continue fighting organized crime, it should not be the Moroccan community paying the price. This community already escaped marginalization from Rif and elsewhere in Morocco for better living conditions in Europe, helping the Dutch and Belgian economy along the way. In face of difficulties, both parties should strive for better inclusion of Moroccans in society. As the fight against organized crime continues, the migrant diaspora and organized crime networks should be distinguished, abandoning the islamophobia and far-right discourse against the Moroccan community.
Bibliography:
Van Amersfoort, Hans, and Anja Van Heelsum. “Moroccan Berber immigrants in the Netherlands, their associations and transnational ties: A Quest for identity and recognition.” Immigrants & Minorities, vol. 25, no. 3, Nov. 2007, pp. 234–262, https://doi.org/10.1080/02619280802407343.
Links:
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/28/outlaws-morocco-rif-provides-refuge-cannabis-farmers
https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/la-mocro-maffia-marocaine-menace-leurope-et-lafrique-du-nord
https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/the-double-edged-sword-of-a-hit-drama/ https://lvsl.fr/repression-des-mouvements-du-rif-par-letat-marocain-aux-origines-de-la-fracture/