Captagon in the Levant: How a drug built an illicit economy, by Elia Razouk

What is Captagon?

Captagon is the street name for fenethylline, a synthetic stimulant belonging to the amphetamine family, which has become particularly common in the Middle East. Today, the drug is mainly produced in Syria and trafficked on a massive scale to Gulf countries. Over time, Captagon has turned into a powerful economic and political tool, notably benefiting the al-Assad regime.

Yet Captagon’s story did not begin in Syria. Its origins lie in Europe. In the 1960s, a German pharmaceutical company developed fenethylline as a psychoactive medication, prescribed to treat attention deficit disorders and narcolepsy. Almost thirty years later, in 1986, the United Nations forbade the substance due to its severe side effects, leading to its withdrawal from legal markets in most countries.

What remained of the drug, however, did not disappear. Existing stocks were smuggled out of Eastern Europe and gradually made their way to the Middle East, where counterfeit tablets began to be produced under the name “Captagon”. This is what eventually fueled one of the largest drug trafficking networks in the region.

Captagon and the Syrian war economy

The production of Captagon in Syria emerged as a way to compensate for the severe lack of resources in a country devastated by more than a decade of war. Since March 2011, when President Bashar al-Assad ordered a violent crackdown on protests, Syria has been plunged into a long civil war. The conflict triggered a deep economic crisis, further amplified by international sanctions. These pressures intensified in December 2019 with the adoption of a U.S. law imposing additional sanctions on the Syrian regime, effectively suffocating an already fragile economy.

In this economical context, the production and smuggling of Captagon generated billions of dollars for Syrian political elites and their close allies, despite the government’s repeated denials of any involvement. Over time, drug exports became one of the regime’s main sources of revenue, helping to sustain the Syrian economy amid war and isolation.

Syria’s Baʿathist Captagon industry is believed to account for nearly 80 percent of global production. The drug is trafficked primarily to countries across the Middle East, including Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Egypt. What was once a small, fragmented production in rebel-held areas, has evolved into a highly organized, industrial operation based largely in territories controlled by the al-Assad regime. This transformation has strengthened criminal networks within Syria and allowed violent actors to accumulate both wealth and power.

Regional consequences 

Captagon trafficking has increased dramatically across Middle Eastern countries over the past few years. Far from being a strictly local issue, Captagon has become a regional problem that affects the entire Middle East. Its circulation has reshaped security dynamics, weakened state authority, and intensified cross-border criminal networks.

In the Levant, Hezbollah’s involvement in Captagon smuggling is widely acknowledged. The group plays a significant role in moving the drug out of Syria, relying on well-established routes through the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon, areas under the group’s influence. To conceal millions of pills, traffickers employ a wide range of methods, including trucks, refrigerated containers, and even livestock shipments. As a result, Lebanon has become a key hub in the regional trafficking network, and the consequences for the country are not negligible.  Nonetheless, smuggling continues largely because borders are poorly monitored, corruption is deeply embedded in state structures, and influential political actors gain from the circulation of the drug.

Across the Syrian border, Jordan has responded with a far more militarized approach. Jordanian armed forces have launched strikes and operations against drug and weapons smugglers, targeting launch points used by trafficking groups to infiltrate Jordanian territory. According to official statements, the military has destroyed several “factories and workshops” linked to these networks, signaling the extent to which drug trafficking has become a national security concern.

While Captagon is deeply embedded in the Levant, some of the largest shipments are destined for Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. U.S. authorities estimate that the Captagon trade generates billions of dollars. This explains why Washington and Riyadh are putting pressure on production and transit countries, urging them to cease the trafficking of the drug. This dynamic became particularly visible in 2023, when Syria’s return to the Arab League was partly justified by the promise that the regime would restrain Captagon production and trafficking beyond its borders.

In sum, captagon is therefore far more than a simple narcotic. In a state hollowed out by war and economic collapse, it has operated as a means of survival, while also serving political, economic, and even diplomatic purposes. The trafficking of this substance across borders, particularly through Lebanon and Jordan, has had serious consequences for neighboring countries, forcing them to adopt increasingly strict security measures to stop the trade.

Beyond the Levant, Captagon flows into Gulf states, where consumption is widespread. This has turned the drug into a tool of diplomatic leverage, shaping negotiations and facilitating a gradual normalization of relations with Damascus.

Yet the fall of Bashar al-Assad in late 2024 marks a turning point. This profound political shift raises critical questions about the future of Captagon networks and their ability to persist without the structures that once sustained them. Whether this illicit economy will diminish, adapt, or re-emerge in new forms remains uncertain and will only be determined by time. What is clear, however, is that the fate of Captagon will continue to reflect the broader transformations reshaping Syria and the Middle East as a whole.

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